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Do Privatizations Boost Household Shareholding?  







It is believed that privatizations substantially contributed to boost stock markets through 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, trough which channels did that materialize? We test 
whether privatizations –improving households’ acquaintance with the risk and return 
characteristics of stocks through the massive accompanying advertising campaigns– 
boosted demand for stocks by enlarging the set of households willing to invest in shares.  
We use a unique micro-data set collected for a large sample of Italian households on 
Public Offerings (PO) during 1995-99, the climax of privatizations in Italy.  We show 
that advertising increased the notoriety of the incoming PO at households, and through 
this furthered households’ propensity to subscribe that PO. Furthermore, the propensity 
to subscribe the incoming PO also increased as households became better informed 
about past privatizations.  Thus, privatizations expanded households’ share participation 
in Italy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Countries endowed with better developed capital markets may be advantaged, particularly 
during phases of intense technological change, as they enjoy a quick reallocation of resources 
to innovative sectors (Allen and Gale, 2000).  In this respect, Italy made a big leap forward in 
the 1990s: the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP went from 10 percent in 1990 to 70 
percent in 2000 (Figure 1).  This noticeable growth of the Italian stock exchange materialized 
along with a prolonged phase of raising share prices but also along with the completion of a 
massive privatization program: the share of the state owned enterprises on the country’s total 
value added was close to one fifth in 1990 and almost zero by 2000.  Indeed, in the 1990s, 
Italy ranked first among the main developed counties in terms of both the volume of 
privatizations as well as the recourse to Public Offerings (POs) on the stock market to 
accomplish them (Table 1). 
This paper tries to evaluate the extent to which privatizations contributed to breed the stock 
market.  We identify two complementary channels through which such contribution possibly 
ensued.  First, a mechanical boost impact resulted as new companies became listed and/or the 
share of state ownership in already listed companies decreased: this provided an increase in 
the supply of traded shares, possibly increasing risk sharing opportunities for investors 
(Pagano 1993).  Second, privatizations may have had a much farther reaching boost impact on 
the stock market by disseminating information on the risk and return characteristics of stocks 
at households and, thus, making them more lenient to invest in shares: this effect may have 
increased the demand for shares.  Our empirical analysis focuses on the latter of these two 
effects. 
We test the occurrence of this effect on a unique micro-data set that collects potential investor 
surveys on the main Public Offerings (POs) during 1995-99, the period when privatizations 
took momentum in Italy.  We use two different methods: a cross-section and a panel analysis.  
For each PO, at least two surveys were conducted: before and after the advertising campaign 
to promote such PO (sometimes there were also one or two intermediate surveys while the 
campaign was ongoing).  While descriptive statistics show that advertising campaigns were 
indeed effective at making households better informed on the incoming PO, the cross-section 
analysis finds that the propensity to subscribe that PO increased as its notoriety at households 
rose.  Furthermore, the panel analysis confirms that the propensity to subscribe the incoming 
PO increases as savers become better informed about past privatizations.  Thus, our evidence 
suggests that privatizations played an important role in expanding Italian households’ share 
participation, which in fact went from 7.9 to 12.7 percent between 1995 and 2000.
1 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Part 1 lays out the background on Italy’s 
privatization process and describes the progress of privatization during the 1990s.  Part 2 
focuses on our hypothesis to be tested: namely, whether, by spawning public information on 
stocks, privatizations made Italian households more inclined to invest in shares.  Thus, section 
2.1 contains a brief review of the relevant literature.  Section 2.2 describes the database used 
in our empirical analysis.  Descriptive statistics on the relationship between privatizations and 
savers’ intention to subscribe POs are presented in Section 2.3, where the hypotheses to be 
tested are also detailed.  The main results of the econometric analyses (both the cross-section 
                                                 
1 Source: Survey of Household, Income, and Wealth (SHIW).  The survey regards Italian households and is run 
every two years by the Banca d’Italia.   2
and panel analyses) are reported and discussed in Section 2.4.  Some conclusions and policy 
implications are drawn at the end of the paper. 
1. A SNAPSHOT ON THE INITIAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS EVOLUTION 
An in-depth analysis on the economic and political determinants of the privatization process 
in Italy is beyond the scope of this paper.
2  However, some background is in order to help 
sketch the initial framework in which the Italian privatization program made its first steps: (i) 
a soaring level of budget deficit and public debt with high government bond spreads; (ii) a 
mounting drag exerted by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) on the public budget; (iii) the 
pressure stemming from the external anchor of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which 
required Italy not only to meet quantitative fiscal and monetary targets (thus setting a 
discontinuity that affected the cost-benefit analysis of policy options) but also to shift from a 
mixed economy to a fully market-based system calling for a much lighter role for   
Government; (iv) an underdeveloped and illiquid domestic capital market; (v) an obsolete  
legal and institutional framework that was unsuitable to modern and open financial and   
currency markets; (v) a currency breakdown (1992-1993), as well as a political and 
institutional crisis, partly reflecting the delay in the adjustment effort required by the EMU 
convergence process.  The 1992 political and institutional crisis was the key turning point that 
forced policymakers to face up to unresolved structural issues, while allowing them for an 
unprecedented room of maneuver. 
However, the first official statement on privatization objectives and priorities was made prior 
to the crisis and it is included in the “Report to the Minister of Treasury” that was set up by 
the so-called Minister Carli’s Committee in 1990.  The report identified five objectives of the 
privatization program: (i) fiscal adjustment; (ii) the development of domestic financial 
markets; (iii) their openness to international capital flows; (iv) improvement in corporate 
efficiency; (v) the strengthening of competition and its introduction in previously 
uncompetitive sectors. 
Being Italian policymakers well aware of the importance of financial markets in public asset 
disposals, two out of the five policy objectives revolved around capital markets; capital 
market development was both a condition for the achievement of the other objectives 
(corporate efficiency and revenue maximization) and a goal in itself.
3 
Clearer indications on prioritization among potentially conflicting objectives as well as on the 
optimization of underling tradeoffs were provided by the “Green Book” and by the “SOEs’ 
Restructuring Program”, which were both submitted by the Treasury to the Parliament in 
November 1991.  Both documents reaffirmed the objectives identified by the “Report to the 
Minister of Treasury”, while downgrading public deficit reduction to a lower rank. 
 
 
                                                 
2 For an empirical analysis on economic and institutional determinants in privatization programs see, e.g.,   
Bortolotti,  Fantini, and Siniscalco (2001).  A complete overview on empirical studies on privatization is 
provided by Megginson, and  Netter (2001), whilst Bortolotti, and Siniscalco (2003) tackle on the economics of 
privatizations.  A comprehensive review of the privatization operations undertaken by the Italian Government 
from 1996 to 2001 is provided in Ministry of the Treasury of Italy (2001).  Finally, Goldstein (2003) presents an 
assessment of the privatization process in Italy. 
3 Levine, and Zervos (1998) point to market liquidity as one of the most robust predictor of long term economic 
growth.   3
 
 
1.1 The Scope and Size of Italy’s Privatization Program  
At the beginning of the last decade the pervasiveness of government involvement in the 
economy was still far above the OECD average: State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) accounted 
for 19% of the value added, 25% of fixed gross investments and 16% of non-agricultural 
employment.
4  SOEs operated in various sectors, including infrastructures, iron and steel 
industry, metallurgy, oil integrated systems, financial sector.  Since then the bulk of state 
assets in those sectors has been sold.  As to privatization proceeds in the last decade Italy 
ranks well above the OECD average and it was first among EU countries. 
Italy also tops all the other EU countries as to the share (roughly 87%) of state-owned assets 
disposed through public offerings; a preliminary, though raw, evidence that supports the view 
that Italian policymakers perceived capital market development as a long-medium term 
objective, to be pursued also by means of complementary reforms (corporate governance), 
rather than a constraint to be eluded through different sale methods.
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Italy  111.30  0.82 87.30  12.70 
Spain  38.40  0.58 59.64  40.36 
Germany  25.06  0.10 58.03  41.97 
France  75.92  0.47 84.63  15.37 
UK 42.81  0.30  51.26  48.74 
  Sources: OECD and Datastream. 
 
 
1.2 Italy’s equity market development and the privatization process 
In the period 1992-2001 Italy’s stock market capitalization rose by over five times (518.4%), 
with most of the gain being ripped during 1997-1999 three year lap.  This positive momentum 
of the domestic equity market – alongside the favorable trend of international stock prices – 
was fed by several internal factors.  Among the latter, a major role was played by the decline 
in yields on government bonds and the stabilization of the Italian currency – prompted by the 
                                                 
4 Source: Ceep, mentioned by  Goldstein, and  Nicoletti (1996). 
5 Bortolotti, Fantini, Siniscalco, and Vitalini (1999) found a negative coefficient, statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, between the ratio of  PO to total sales in privatization programs and the occurrence of French-type 
civil law regimes, under which shareholders enjoy more limited legal protection. 
6 Figures refer only to transactions carried out by the central government and by (entirely) state-owned 
enterprises.  Figures on Public Offerings/Total and Trade Sale/Total ratios refer to the period 1992-2000 and 
have been elaborated on the basis of IFR - Thomson Financial International data.   4
achieved Italian compliance with Maastricht requirements – and the liberalization of the 
financial sector.    5
Figure 1- Increase in Italy’s Stock Market Capitalization (1979-2002) 
Source: Italian Stock Exchange  
 
During the same period the liquidity indicators of the domestic equity market showed an even 
more pronounced improvement: trading volumes grew by over 35 times, while the turnover 
ratio
7 increased from 18.33 percent in 1992 to 80.40 percent in 2001. 
 
Figure 2 – Trading Volumes and Turnover Ratios in Italy’s Stock Exchange (1980-2002) 
 
 
Sources: Datastream and Italian Stock Exchange 
As to end march 2002; figures for 2002 turnover ratio are forecast. 
 
 
It is perhaps arbitrary to infer a causality link from privatization to equity market 
development.  However, evidence appears to support the view that the state asset disposal 
program provided an important mechanic contribution.  In 2001 the number of fully and 
                                                 
7 The turnover ratio is equal to the total value of shares traded over a particular year divided by prior year-end 






























































































































Scambi azionari  (scala sinistra in ML euro)
Turnover ratio (scala destra, valore degli scambi/capitalizzazione anno precedente)
Shares volumes  (left scale Million of euro)
Turnover ratio (right scale)  6
partially privatized companies’ traded shares
8 accounted for roughly 48 percent of the total 
trading volume in the Italian stock exchange.  Concerning the rise in market capitalization, at 
end March 2002 about 42 percent of Italian equity market capitalization was accounted for by 
partially or fully privatized companies.
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Public offering  73.522   4.038.192   5.036.575   4.903.742   8.170.965   22.162.849   26.587.522   39.748.344   49.285.231   52.132.323 
Total stock market  4.768.512   32.411.744   39.563.728   38.621.392   48.720.400   108.655.39  116.845.48  138.346.36  128.356.16  119.394.75




1.3 Impact on Portfolios. 
The outlined stock market performance is matched by an equally impressive evidence when 
looking at the impact on transactions undertaken by savers.  Public offerings involved almost 
20 millions investors,
10 including about 467,000 employees of the privatized firms.  This was 
largely due to the decision to resort to public offerings.  Although share ownership structures 
in partially and fully privatized companies showed a trend towards concentration,
11 at end 
May 2001 stockholders of privatized firms were over 8.2 millions, not so far from the figure 
of 10 million shareholders crated by British privatizations. 
Meanwhile, the composition of household saving and enterprise liabilities has deeply changed 
during the 1990s.  At the beginning of the program (1991), household investments in stocks 
and mutual investment funds (generally featuring some equity investment) accounted for, 
respectively, 18 and a mere 2.3 percent of their total assets.  At end 2000 stocks and mutual 
funds accounted for, respectively, 23.7 and 15.1 percent of household assets.  
                                                 
8 Telecom Italia, San Paolo Imi, Seat-Pagine Gialle, Finmeccanica, Eni, Enel, Unicredito Italiano, Bca. Naz. 
Lavoro, Banca Di Roma, Alitalia, Autostrade, Intesa Bci , Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena.                                                 
9 Telecom Italia, San Paolo Imi, Seat-Pagine Gialle, Finmeccanica, Eni, Enel, Unicredito Italiano, BNL, Banca 
di Roma, Alitalia , Autostrade, Intesa Bci                                                  
10 R&S Mediobanca (2000), pp. 61-62.  The figure includes the applicants for all the public offerings in the 
period. Since a certain number of investors may have subscribed to more than one offering the number may 
entail some overlap. 
11 This is consistent with the findings of Megginson, and Boutchkova (2000); on a sample of large transactions 
with more than 100,000 initial stockholders, they found that the number of shareholders declined on average by 
33 percent in the five years subsequent to the issue. 
14 Source of data on assets and liabilities of households and enterprises: Banca d’Italia (various years).  
Source: Datastream and Italian stock exchange   7
The composition of enterprise liabilities experienced similar patterns.  The shift towards 
equity funding began in the 1980s and strengthened in the 1990s; the share of bank loans 
declined from 34 percent in 1991 to 22.0 in 2001, while that of equity increased from 48 to 




1.3 Promotion of the Equity Culture 
The international comparison as to the share of state-owned assets disposed through state 
offering, on a revenue basis, supports the conjecture that policymakers assigned a high rank to 
the goal of capital market development. 
A frequently used proxy for the “political” nature
15 of the pricing in state asset disposals is the 
extent of underpricing.
16  As to the Italian program, the weighted average of underpricing for 
the 8 operations that were tracked by the database Abacus was around 9 percent.  The number 
is much lower than the mean level (34.1 percent) that Jones, et al. (1999) found on a sample 
of privatization issues undertaken by 59 governments (including developing countries).   
Though the significance of the comparison is sensitive to the institutional framework as well 
as to the computation method, this comparison supports the view that the cost for the Italian 




2. DO PRIVATIZATIONS SPREAD INFORMATION BOOSTING HOUSEHOLD 
SHAREHOLDING? 
 
2.1 Review of the Relevant Literature 
The previous section charted the main features of the privatization process in Italy during the 
1990s.  We provided an assessment of its quantitative impact in several directions: proceeds 
raised by the Italian state, increase of the stock market capitalization and amount of small 
savers becoming shareholders of privatized companies.  We also reported our understanding 
of the general setting in which the privatization can be framed.  The combined strategy to 
improve on the equity culture and to sell mostly through public offerings rather than traded 
sales is the one key feature of the privatization process.
18  We ended up reporting large 
changes in Italy’s financial accounts.  In particular, households’ portfolio recorded a relevant 
increase in the proportion of equity holdings (either held directly or via mutual funds). 
                                                 
15 Broadly speaking, the term here stands for whatever political and economic goal other than revenue 
maximization.  Besides, underpricing can strategically signal the government commitment towards a long term 
privatization process, thus strengthening its credibility (Bortolotti, Fantini, Siniscalco, Vitalini, 1999). 
16 That is, the percentage difference between the issue price and the stock price at the end of the first day’s 
trading; it is a measure of one-day return an investor who purchased shares at the offering price could earn by 
reselling those shares at the end of the first day’s trading. 
18 Alongside, it should be recognized the effort undertaken by Italian authorities to improve on the institutional 
framework through the privatization of the stock-market itself and the improvement of corporate governance.   8
Here we attempt to explain the relevant increase in the participation rate by households (i.e., 
in the percentage of households that own private stocks), with a demand side effect induced – 
also – by the privatization process itself.  In line with other authors (Sudrahmanyam, and 
Titman, 1999; Bortolotti, at al., 2002), we expect that the increased amount of information 
available to the “average” small saver led to a reduction of participation (i.e. entrance) costs to 
the stock market. 
This explanation complements the approach usually taken in the literature that studies 
households’ stock market participation decisions.  We start by reviewing the main 
contributions in this field covering both theoretical aspects and empirical findings; 
furthermore, special attention is devoted to the information available for Italy. 
Determinants of the participation rate are usually founded on portfolio decision theory.   
Additionally, they recognize the need to take into account social and demographical aspects 
and the possible existence of entry barriers, possibly enhanced by institutional factors. 
The relationship between age and financial investment is quite controversial.  King and Leape 
(1987) point out that the process of learning and of increasing sophistication of the financial 
investor should be related to the life cycle; therefore portfolio diversification should increase 
with age.  Paxons (1990) reaches similar conclusions claiming that the young are more 
subject to liquidity constraints than adults and, for this reason, they would tend not to invest in 
risky assets.  The view of Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1998) is different.  They argue that 
the young are more flexible (i.e. employable) in the labor market, allowing them to 
compensate more easily for possible setbacks; as a consequence, the young should be more 
prone to take risk.  Furthermore, the shortening of the available horizon related to ageing 
deprives individuals of opportunities to diversify shocks through time (Gollier, and 
Zeckhauser, 1997). 
The impact of income uncertainty on portfolio decision is less intensely debated.  In general, 
it is accepted that if an household faces an income risk that cannot be insured, it will downsize 
its exposition to risks that it can control (Gollier, 2001).  A self-employed worker will face a 
relatively high amount of labor income risk, as a consequence it is expected that ceteris 
paribus he will prefer a low level of risk for his financial investment. 
Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996), giving rise to a body of empirical literature devoted to 
Italy, address exactly this issue.  They relate exposure to risk of a representative sample of 
Italian households (contained in the household survey SHIW) to their perception of future 
income risk.  In a subsequent paper, Guiso and Japelli (2000) show that participation decision 
to financial markets obey different rules from those related to the – logically subsequent – 
decision on the share of savings to be put on that form of investment.  The decision to 
undertake a risky investment is related to wealth and education, whilst the relationship with 
age is parabolic.  The relevance of wealth can be explained with regressive entry costs.  The 
authors find also that background risks can influence the participation decision, as a proxy for 
this sort of risk they use the unemployment rate of the province where the household is 
located.  This result is largely consistent with the theories of substitution of multiple risks.  
Finally, Jappelli, Jiulliard and Pagano (2001) add a slightly different perspective studying 
how social and demographic features affect participation to new, for the Italian market, 
financial products, e.g.. investment funds.   
An additional relevant input for our paper is represented by a body of research that looks at 
the interaction between privatization and financial market developments. In their reviews 
Chiesa and Nicodano (2003) concentrate on the determinants of market liquidity.  They   9
indicate public available information and riskiness of the market portfolio as two key drivers. 
The latter factor, in particular, was modeled in Pagano (1993), where the underlying idea is 
that a boost of PO’s due to the privatization can largely increase the diversification 
opportunities of market participants and lead to an higher level of investment – and therefore 
of liquidity –  in the market.  Bortolotti et alt (2002) in their empirical contribution find a 
relevant impact of privatization on market liquidity. Indeed, higher market liquidity can arise 
due to higher investment of agents already operating in the market or to an increased 
participation. Here we use the same kind of arguments to look directly at the impact of the 
mentioned factors on household portfolio decisions. 
 
 
2.2 Information Available on Italian Households and Our Database  
The goal of the econometric analysis in the next sections is to empirically test our conjecture 
on the impact of privatizations on Italian households’ financial choice.  For this sake, the 
widely used SHIW surveys are not suitable,
19 and we rely on a different database.  Namely, 
we use data from surveys administered from 1995 to 1999.  The launch of every large PO was 
preceded by a number of surveys run at several stages.  The first survey was dispensed 
immediately before the start of the PO advertising campaign, the last one was carried out at 
the end of the campaign, when the PO was about to be launched.  Table 2 shows the main 
features of our database, i.e.: the list of surveyed POs, the specific number of survey stages – 
from a minimum of two to a maximum of four – for each PO, the total number of interviewed 
households in each stage. 
 
Table 2 –  ABACUS Surveys by Stage  
 
Surveys aimed to monitor the attitude of households toward each PO and the privatization 
process in general.  In addition to social and demographic data and to the portfolio of the 
interviewed, survey questionnaires provided information of great importance to our end, 
covering: notoriety of the company, willingness to subscribe, attitude towards the company to 
                                                 
19 Interviewed individuals report only whether their portfolio includes shares of privatized companies.   
Information concerning either subscription intentions or actual purchase of separate POs is not included. 
ENI 1 ENI 2 ENI 3 TELECOM ENI 4 BNL ENEL AUTOSTRADE
November October June October May November October November
1995 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999
Total 3,048 4,515 3,015 6,010 3,005 6,004 6,007 4,508
Stage 1 1,004 1,504 1,511 1,504 1,501 1,500 1,501 1,500
Stage 2 1,005 1,506 1,504 1,502 1,504 1,504 1,500 1,504
Stage 3 1,039 1,505 - 1,504 - 1,500 1,500 1,504







18 25 30 35 40 45 50  55  60  65  70 75 80
be privatized and, as general information, view on the financial market situation and on the 
profitability of equity investment.  The appendix reports more details. 
The aim of the initial stage of our analysis is twofold: we report some evidence on how social 
and demographic factors interacted with the evolution of participation rate from 1995 to 1999; 
at the same time we benchmark these findings against what was evicted from the SHIW 
survey and from an ad-hoc survey (Centro Einaudi) in the above mentioned papers. 
The relationship between age and participation is represented in Figure 4; reporting both the 
evidence from our dataset and that from the SHIW survey (as presented by Guiso, and 
Jappelli, 2000).  The x axis represents different classes of age (five year intervals), the y axis 
features the participation rate, i.e. the percentage amount of households having stocks in their 
portfolio.  Each observation for each class has one observation for each year; average values 
for each class are joined by a line.  This gives, in both cases, a hump-shaped relationship.  
However, in our case the participation rate of the elderly class is much higher.  This 
divergence can be explained observing that the Guiso and Japelli information dates back to 
the period 1989-1995, when the privatization process had not yet taken speed.  The data, 
therefore, suggest that elderly classes were more intensely involved in the subscription of POs 
in the 1995-99 period. 
 
Figure 4 – Participation By Age 
 
Consistently with theory predictions and with SHIW survey evidence, we also find a positive 
link between participation and education.  The analysis is less straightforward for professions 
as two dimensions are potentially involved: (i) a wealth effect (related to the different income 
level); (ii) the previously mentioned risk effect.  Although a few professions seem to be more 
risky, namely managers and directors, for them the wealth effect is certainly prevailing. 
The high participation rate of the retired – that is consistent with the age related evidence –, 
may be interpreted in at least two ways: (a) multiple risk theory suggests that income risk 
becomes very low for pension-holders; (b) in Italy severance payments are quite high, thus 













30% Guiso-Jappelli 1989-1995 Treasury 1995 - 1999   11
 
Figure 5 – Participation By Profession 
 
2.3 Households’ Intention to Subscribe POs: Descriptive Evidence and Hypotheses to Be Tested 
The surveys enable us to evaluate the impact of additional variables on the decision to 
subscribe public offerings.  We focus on two issues: (i) whether and to what extent 
advertising campaigns boosted the decision to purchase POs; (ii) whether and to what extent 
the privatization process on the whole contributed to attract new savers to financial markets. 
We start reporting the evidence that surveys gathered, econometric analysis follows. 
On the first issue, we find that advertising campaigns were always effective at increasing the 
notoriety of the company.  Figure 6 reports for each privatization: a) the notoriety of the PO in 
the first-stage survey, i.e. before the promotional campaign, and b) the increase in notoriety 














As an indirect impact of the increase in notoriety, we expect a rise in the share of households 
answering that they intend to purchase; however, this is not always true at face value: in three 
cases (ENI-1, Telecom, BNL) the share actually decreases during the campaign.  
Figure 6 – Notoriety of POs Before the 














































































































































































Nevertheless, there might be additional factors that change individuals’ perception during the 
campaign, e.g., the stock market behavior: short term (in this case one or two months) 
changes of direction could influence the intentions to purchase stocks.  
Figure 8 shows the Italian index MIB between September 1995 and November 1999, the 
period enclosing the privatizations we are studying.  The time frame of each PO, from the 
initial survey to the final one, is clearly marked. 
 
Figure 8 –  Stock Market Behavior During the Privatization Process 
 
Our surveys contain two questions regarding the perception of the interviewed with respect to 
the past and future behavior of the stock market.  The answers are aggregated and displayed in 
Figure 9.  Inspection of Figures 8 and 9 reveals that changes in the perception of the stock 
market behavior are quite close to the changes of the stock market index. 








Indice MIB (settembre 1995 - novembre 1999)























Before campaign  During campaign  Before offering  13
We suggest that what matters is the perception of the stock market behavior by our 
representative households.  We find indeed that in the case of ENI-1 and Telecom, there is a 
worsening in expectations.  We shall pursue this issue in the econometric analysis to follow. 
 











Marketing efforts and stock market fluctuations can considerably influence individuals’ 
decisions.  However, if we analyze a markedly different time frame, i.e. the whole period for 
which we have data, the same conclusion would hardly hold.  More structural and deeply 
rooted factors are needed to explain why a significant share of Italian savers opted to 
subscribe POs generating a relevant increase of the participation rate.  Figure 10 presents 
some evidence in this respect.  It shows the percentage of households that, at the time of the 
survey, had no shares and were willing to subscribe the new PO.  The progression in the 
increase of the participation rate suggests that, not only initial shareholders remain in the 









































































ENI 1  ENI 2  ENI 3 TELECOM BNL ENEL  AUTOSTRADE 
Andamento della  ( positivo-negativo)



























































ENI 1  ENI 2  ENI 3 TELECOM BNL ENEL  AUTOSTRADE 
Stock market behaviour ( positive-negative)
For the future 




















Shares owners  Have no stock market shares, but are willing to 
subscribe the new PO 
26,69  26,04 26,46
32,10
36,51
30,52   14
Valuable information can be extracted from a group of questions that give a picture of 
households’ attitude toward financial markets.  Interviewed people were asked to rank their 
degree of assent with five statements: “stock investment is a bet”, “I frequently considered the 
idea to invest in stocks”, “I do not know how to invest in stocks”, “stock market investment is 
more profitable than holding government securities”, and “stock market investment is 
rewarding only for well-off people”.  The degree of assent could be: I agree completely, I 
agree, I do not know, I do not agree and I do not agree at all.  We built a quantitative index 
giving to each answer respectively the following score: 2, 1, 0,-1, -2. 
Table 3 summarizes the values of the five variables.  It shows, first of all, that households 
were increasingly considering investing in stocks.  At the same time, the perception of the 
profitability of investing in stocks grew over time in two directions: it was perceived 
increasingly more rewarding than government bonds and it became less obvious that stock 
market investment is a good investment only for rich people (although ENI-2 data is a bit 
difficult to explain).  Information seems to improve as we detect a decrease in the agreement 
with the statement “I would not know how to invest in stocks”.  The perception that this form 
of investment is risky remains stable. 
Table 3 – Considering Investing in Stocks 
  Stock market investment 
Survey  …is a bet  I frequently 
considered the idea 
.. I don’t know
how to invest 
… is more profitable 
than government 
obligations 
… is rewarding only 
for well-off people 
ENI1  - - -  -  - 
ENI2  0.436 -0.656 -0.325  -0.140  0.272 
ENI3  0.451 -0.518 -0.377  0.018  0.568 
TELECOM  0.420 -0.533 -0.259  0.158  0.535 
BNL  0.519 -0.289 -0.432  0.233  0.472 
ENEL  0.453 -0.193 -0.429  0.324  0.338 
AUTOSTRADE  - - -  -  - 
 
 
2.4 Econometric analysis 
The above descriptive evidence provided some support to our argument that the privatization 
process triggered a demand side effect that accompanied the mere issuing of stock shares.  In 
this section we provide more solid ground founding our argument on econometric analysis. 
We resort to two types of regressions: they deal, respectively, with subscription intensions 
within each PO and through the whole sample period.  In both cases information related to the 
privatizations plays a major role in explaining the increase in intentions to subscribe.   
However, the content of information changes markedly: in the first case it is notoriety of the 
company, as affected by the promotion campaign, in the second it is the general increase in 
information provided by the privatization process.  The former analysis is more clear-cut.  
The latter is more challenging as it is hard to disentangle the impact of the privatization 
process from that of institutional/market  changes undergoing in the five years considered. 
Before reporting the results of our regression we need to cover one issue concerning data.  In 
fact, the data in the surveys are not a panel, i.e. in each survey a different random drawing of 
households to be interviewed was made.  The drawing criteria were, however, designed so   15
that each sample was representative of the population of potential subscribers.  This allows us 
to build, following Deaton (1985), a pseudo panel.  We keep track of groups representative of 
the population.  We transform the dataset so that each observation is the mean values of the 
individuals pertaining to a given group.  Notably, the intention to subscribe a PO – rather than 
a binary (0,1) variable – becomes a continuous variable included in the interval (0,1).  The 
main criterion according to which an individual is assigned to a group is age, so that groups 
are identified by cohorts.  However, subdivisions are also possible; Deaton distinguishes 
between manual and non manual workers.  We opted for the following criterion: age (three 
cohorts – young, middle age, and mature), education (low education and high education), 
profession (three income-related subgroups); for a total of eighteen classes. 
 
2.4.1 Cross section analysis 
In this section we want to pin down the impact of the advertising campaigns on demand.  In 
this case we use, as dependent variable, the change in the intention to subscribe occurred 
between the initial survey and the final survey of each PO propit.  As outlined above, we want 
to use as regressors the change in the company’s notoriety notorietyit and, as a control, the 
change in expectations of the stock market profitability stockExit.  We also tried additional 
specifications including more controls to capture the attitude toward the investment in the 
stock market as described in the previous section. 
it t i t i t i attitude stockEx notoriety prop ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆         γ β α  
with t representing each PO and i each group: 
Table 4 gives the result of a panel regression.  Information for the supplementary control 
variables was not available in two surveys, the different sample is accounted for in the table. 
The constant term (i.e. the ith class specific parameter) was deliberately omitted as it was 
canceled out by the difference operator. 
 
Table 4-Cross-sectional Regressions: Benchmarking 
Notoriety 0.042 0.036 0.047 0.042 0.070 0.075
(2.3) (1.8) (2.5) (2.2) (3.4) (3.7)
Perception of the stock market behaviour  0.100 0.073 0.088 0.081 0.138 0.192
(3.4) (2.3) (2.6) (2.3) (3.6) (5.5)
Degree of assent with investment on shares
I frequently considered the idea  0.123 0.130 0.154 0.153
(5.1) (5.1) (6.2) (5.9)
I don’t know how to invest -0.015 -0.031
(-0.7) (-1.4)
...is rewarding only for well-off people -0.115 -0.091
(-3.5) (-2.9)
...is a bet 0.038 0.004
(1.4) (0.18)
is more profitable than government obligations -0.029 -0.060
(-1.0) (-2.15)
R-squared 0.68 0.54 0.46 0.38 0.17 0.22
F-statistic 29.11 24.65 17.80 26.53 17.80 33.96




n. obs=90  
n. obs  for 7 tranches=126 
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The main result is that we found the variables included in the base specification (notoriety and 
stock market expectations) to be correctly signed and almost always significant.  The 
variables included in the specification provide a sensitiveness and robustness check.  The 
order of their exposition in the table is suggestive of their decreasing “closeness” to the 
intention to subscribe.  For instance, the statement “I frequently thought over buying shares” 
is highly related to the decision itself to subscribe a PO and a positive coefficient is definitely 
expected.  The statement, “purchasing a share is a bet” is less clearly related although a 
negative sign should be expected: if the perception that shares are risky decreases one would 
expect an increase of the intentions to subscribe.  Whilst the change in notoriety is clearly 
directly related to the advertising campaign, we are less confident that all attitude variables 
would be affected in a clear and systematic way.  Therefore, although most of the sings seem 
to be correct, we put less emphasis on the extended specifications. 
 
2.4.2 Panel analysis 
The second set of regressions intends to evaluate the impact of the privatization process on 
households’ participation rate to financial markets.  This is achieved indirectly, checking 
whether the increase overtime in the propensity to purchase was related to the enhanced 
dissemination of information that the privatizations brought about. 
In order to do that, we introduce as the dependent variable the level of the propensity to 
purchase.  Its level, generally increasing through time, has to be explained with more deeply 
rooted factors than the effects of advertising campaigns.  Identifying privatization related 
increases in information is the most difficult task.  Our specification tries to capture this in 
two ways.  To start with, we introduce again the attitude variables.  However, also in this 
case, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the privatization process from other causes.  For 
instance, the decreasing assent with the statement “I would not know how to invest in stocks”, 
can be explained with several factors.  Advertising campaigns provided information (or 
stimulus to gather more information) but also banks’ effort to sell new products to their 
clients generated an increase of knowledge. 
We therefore built a variable aiming to proxy the information purely related to the 
privatization process.  That information was the percentage of past PO known to interviewed 
people.  We do find that this percentage is increasing over time and we regard it as a 
cumulated increase of information. 
Consistently with the literature reviewed on the participation decision, we introduced 
additional explanatory variables related to geographical, demographic and social features of 
the interviewed and to their portfolio composition  (ownership of stock market shares). 
A factor that we also wanted to control for was the quality of the PO as perceived by potential 
subscribers.  The surveys included a set of statements that were designed to convey this 
image, as explained, interviewed were asked to express their agreement or dissent with them.  
We used four such questions
20: 1) the company owns advanced technology; 2) the company 
operates in international markets; 3) it has a sound financial position; 4) it works in strategic 
sectors of the Italian economy.  Assent with these statements was to be interpreted with a 
positive judgment.  In order to save degrees of freedom and to eliminate multicorrelation 
                                                 
20 Answers follow a scale from 1 to 10 (for Telecom we performed a transformation form a 1-5 scale to a 1-10 
scale).   17
problems, we extracted a principal component out of the four.  The factor explains 59% of the 
variability, all loads are positive: in the same order as above 0.38, 0.35, 0.30, and 0.26. 
We built a panel tobit with random effects, groups are the same used in the previous set of 
regression. 
The model can be described with the following equation: 
() it it it it it it it Perception Demograph Shares Invest StockEx cum Know f prop , , , , , _










1    if       1   
1   - 1    if      












where, for each tranche t, and each cohort i: 
Know_cumit is the percentage of past POs of which interviewed are aware, StockExit is the 
perceived behavior of the stock market; Investit is a set of variable capturing the household’s 
attitude toward stock market investment, Sharesit is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the 
household invests in stocks and zero otherwise; Demographit  is a group of demographic 
controls;  Pereceptionit  measures households’ qualitative assessment on how well 
known/important is the company under PO. 
We ended up with the specification illustrated in Table 5.  Households’ propensity to 
subscribe is significantly affected by the cumulative knowledge variable, by ownership of 
shares and by the perception of the company (as synthesized by the factor variable).  Also a 
few demographic variables matter (sex and being head of the household).  Volatility of the 
stock market and stock market behavior are no longer relevant; whilst the variable that gives 
the information content on how to invest is correctly signed but still insignificant. 
Table 5 – Panel Analysis – Tobit Model Estimations
21 
 
Propensity to purchase POs 
 Coefficient  Student’s  t 
Cumulative Notoriety  .948 1.98 
Perception of the Company (I Principal Component )   .024 2.34 
Stock Market Behavior            .042 0.98 
Stock Market Volatility              -.045 -1.22 
Information About Stock Market         -.056 -1.90 
Return On Shares  .056 1.53 
Transactions Costs  .045 1.37 
Past Ownership Of Shares    .577 3.53 
Geographic Area  -.079 -1.64 
Town Size  -.011 -0.41 
Sex  -.210 -3.78 
Head Of the Household  .197 4.00 
Constant                -.455 -2.99 
                                                 
21 Tobit estimation was adopted because of the accumulation of observations at the –1 extreme caused by the 
structure of the questionnaire. Future research will entail additional effort on this matter.    18
 
2.5 Conclusions 
It is widely believed that listings of formerly state-owned companies substantially contributed 
to boost stock markets –particularly in developed countries– as privatization programs ensued 
through the 1980s and 1990s.  However, the channels through which such effect materialized 
are still insufficiently explored.  This paper contributed to fill the gap exploring the 
hypothesis that privatization programs –beside mechanically increasing the supply of listed 
shares– boosted demand for stocks by enlarging the set of households willing to invest in 
shares.  The effect would result as privatizations triggered massive advertising that improved 
households’ acquaintance with the risk and return characteristics of stocks: in turn, the 
enhanced dissemination of information may have increased –perhaps permanently– 
households’ participation in shareholding. 
We tested the occurrence of this effect on a unique micro-data set collected for a large sample 
of Italian households on eight Public Offerings (PO) during 1995-99, the period when 
privatizations took momentum in Italy.  We used two different methods: a cross-section and a 
panel analysis.  For each PO, households were surveyed at least twice: before and after the 
advertising campaign to promote such PO.  While descriptive statistics showed that 
advertising campaigns were indeed effective at making households better informed on the 
incoming PO, our cross-section analysis found that the propensity to subscribe that PO 
increased as its notoriety at households rose.  Furthermore, the panel analysis confirmed that 
the propensity to subscribe the incoming PO increased as households became better informed 
about previous privatizations.  Thus, our evidence suggests that privatizations played an 
important role in expanding Italian households’ share participation, which in fact went from 
7.9 to 12.7 percent between 1995 and 2000.   19
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APPENDIX 
Synthetic survey questionnaire  
 
1.  Geographic area 
2.  City size 
3.  Sex 
4.  Age 
5.  Present profession 
6.  If retired: last profession 
7.  Head of the household? 
8.  Profession of the head of the household 
9.  At the moment do you own: current account; savings bankbook; insurance policy;      investment trust; 
treasury bills/bonds; shares? 
10. When you decide to invest your savings, what is more important? (high short-term revenue, high long-
term revenue, safe investment, liquidity) 
Degree of assent with (I agree completely; I agree; I do not know; I do not agree; I do not agree at all): 
11. Investing in stocks is a bet  
12. I frequently considered investing in stocks 
13. I don’t know how to invest in stocks 
14. Investing in stocks is more profitable than holding government securities 
15. Investing in stocks is rewarding only for well-off people  
16. Do you know any company on whose shares the Government is going to make a PO? 
17. Which companies have been privatized by the Government over the last three years? 
18. Which ones are the most profitable companies among those the Government is going to privatize? 
 
Now focus your attention on company X; how much do you agree with the following assertions? (scale 
from 1 to 10): 
19. It’s profitable 
20. It’s bureaucratic/inefficient 
21. It’s a precursor on technology 
22. It’s state owned, influenced by politics 
23. It’s international 
24. It’s solid and safe 
25. It works in the main sector of the economy 
26. It’s worth owning its shares 
27. How much are you interested to buy shares of company X? 
28. For which reasons aren’t you interested to buy shares of company X? 
29. For which reasons are you interested to buy shares of company X? 
30. How likely will you buy shares of company X? 
31. Have you decided yet to buy shares or you’re waiting for more information? 
32. How much money might you invest on shares of company X? 
33. If you decided investing in shares of company X, how long are you planning to hold the shares before 
selling them? 
34. In the past have you ever bought shares of the company below? 
35. Are you still holding these shares? 
36. In your opinion, how good  an investment was subscribing Pos in the past? 
37. Do you favour the program of POs made by the Government? 
38. How do you consider the state of the stock market over the last year it?  
39. And what will, in your opinion, be the stock market state in the next months?  
40. The Government is also going to make a PO for another company Y. How interested might you be in 
buying shares of it? 
41. The Government is also going to make a public offering for another company Z. How interested might 
you be in buying shares of it? 
42. Which is your education level? 
43. Which is the education level of the head of the household?   22
Table 1- Portfolio Composition by Education – Percentage 
 
Composition  None Primary  Secondary  High  secondary University 
current account  - 11.38  32.32 44.29  11.61 
savings bankbook  -  13.29 36.14  42.29  8.00 
BOT,CCT (*)  -  10.13 27.95  47.18 14.49 
shares  - 7.67  19.51  53.31  19.51 






none   -  18.32 34.35  38.93  5.34 
current account  0.53 11.51  32.84  44.18  10.95 
savings bankbook  1.49 13.76  35.47  43.86  5.43 
BOT,CCT (*)  0.56 11.06  27.09  46.77  14.53 
shares  0.00 4.55  21.21  55.76 18.48 






none   5.41 26.67  31.57  32.83  3.52 
current account  0.37 10.93  30.42  46.70  11.58 
savings bankbook  0.49 13.30  32.62  46.70  6.89 
BOT,CCT (*)  0.42 10.42  27.36  47.78  14.03 
shares  0.35 5.54  22.15  52.60 19.38 






none   2.71 21.50  37.79  34.86  3.13 
current account  0.63 10.78  32.53  44.95  11.11 
savings bankbook  1.40 13.17  33.58  45.12  6.73 
BOT,CCT (*)  0.26 10.02  29.27  44.99  15.46 
shares  0.00 6.44  20.37  52.39 20.79 









none   2.36 21.21  34.18  39.35  2.90 
current account  0.28 8.25  27.54  50.28 13.64 
savings bankbook  0.52 10.02  29.77  51.06  8.64 
BOT,CCT (*)  0.45 7.24  22.40  52.38 17.53 
shares  0.27 4.70  17.45  55.97 21.61 





none   0.81 16.46  32.73  44.24  5.76 
current account  0.46 9.03  26.08  50.79 13.65 
savings bankbook  0.77 11.62  28.08  49.62  9.91 
BOT,CCT (*)  0.30 9.94  22.85  51.19 15.73 
shares  0.21 4.83  18.29  58.79 17.88 






none   2.10 17.46  34.81  42.10  3.54 
current account  0.32 9.07  28.48  49.30 12.84 
savings bankbook  0.58 10.69  30.97  49.68  8.09 
BOT,CCT (*)  0.22 8.67  22.89  49.78 18.44 
shares  0.26 5.14  21.21  55.27 18.12 












none   2.78 18.33  33.47  40.56  4.86 
(*) BOT=Treasury bills; CCT=Government bonds.  
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Table 2 - Portfolio Composition by Age – Percentage 
   Age  group 
  Composition  18 - 24  25 - 34  35 - 44  45 - 54  55 - 64  65 and more 
current account  -  26.81 28.68 21.44 17.21  5.87 
savings bankbook  -  30.86 29.86 18.71 14.71  5.86 
BOT.CCT  -  22.44 26.03 22.56 21.15  7.82 
shares  -  25.49 27.45 24.02 17.16  5.88 






None   -  25.95 21.37 16.03 26.72  9.92 
current account  10.09 21.76 20.30 17.66 16.57  13.62 
savings bankbook  17.18 23.06 18.09 15.44 13.24  12.98 
BOT.CCT  7.97  18.28 16.87 17.43 20.15  19.31 
shares  8.20  21.43 21.16 17.72 16.67  14.81 






None   25.28 15.47 11.45 14.34 13.08  20.38 
current account  10.56 20.65 20.60 19.07 15.81  13.30 
savings bankbook  19.13 23.20 19.42 15.73 13.20  9.32 
BOT.CCT  9.31  16.53 18.47 18.61 20.83  16.25 
shares  8.77  21.10 25.21 15.07 18.08  11.78 






None   28.39 19.42 13.78 13.15 13.15  12.11 
current account  10.12 22.21 20.32 18.80 16.25  12.29 
savings bankbook  18.95 23.26 16.65 14.91 13.45  12.78 
BOT.CCT  8.38  18.39 16.75 18.57 21.59  16.32 
shares  5.67  21.32 21.32 20.55 17.02  14.11 









None   25.48 16.77 14.23 13.15 13.51  16.86 
current account  9.51  24.17 23.62 20.21 13.71  8.78 
savings bankbook  19.00 25.47 21.69 16.03 10.07  7.73 
BOT.CCT  8.37  19.80 19.68 20.36 17.99  13.80 
shares  7.02  23.72 24.60 19.47 15.71  9.49 





None   24.65 20.10 17.78 16.16 12.22  9.09 
current account  9.87  21.40 21.38 19.26 15.87  12.22 
savings bankbook  17.17 23.30 19.29 16.40 13.10  10.74 
BOT.CCT  8.46  14.84 14.54 20.77 22.11  19.29 
shares  6.63  20.64 20.30 19.80 18.46  14.18 






None   28.40 17.35 16.02 12.15 12.93  13.15 
current account  10.19 23.02 21.04 18.58 15.84  11.30 
savings bankbook  18.48 24.12 19.93 14.30 13.29  9.89 
BOT.CCT  10.00 16.89 19.11 17.33 18.89  17.78 
shares  7.65  18.17 21.04 20.90 18.85  13.39 












None   25.28 18.06 15.56 12.64 13.06  15.42 
(*) BOT=Treasury bills; CCT=Government bonds. 
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Table 3 – Propensity to Purchase the PO in Progress 
 
   Stage 
    1 2 3 4 
ENI 1  45.62%  43.28%  39.56%   
ENI 2  22.14%  21.05%  23.52%   
ENI 3  18.86%  20.15%     
TELECOM  22.01% 23.44% 24.80% 20.80% 
BNL  26.87% 26.66% 24.40% 24.87% 
ENEL  25.78% 29.07% 29.07% 29.22% 
AUTOSTRADE 18.40%  22.01%  22.27%   
 
 





Increase in notoriety 
from the beginning to 




ENI 1  4.08%  19.11%  11.08% 
ENI 2  8.31%  16.54%  16.79% 
ENI 3  9.79%  16.93%  18.26% 
TELECOM 7.45%  27.55%  18.38% 
BNL 2.67%  14.80%  6.46% 
ENEL 21.59%  40.37%  41.60% 
AUTOSTRADE 4.13%  15.28%  10.11%   25
Note about cohorts 
We used three variables to construct the cohorts: age, profession/revenue, education, according to the following 
groups:  
age:   young (18-30) 
      adult (31-55) 
      senior (56 e and more); 
 
profession:  high revenue (manager, employee, teacher, retired) 
         medium revenue (trader, farmer, factory worker) 
         low revenue (unemployed, housewife, student) 
 
education: high (high secondary, university) 
      low (none, primary, low secondary). 
 
Tab. 5 - Cross section analysis – Variables used 
Acronym Variable  Scale  Construction 
      
∆Prop  Propensity to purchase POs  (-1=no, 0=I don’t know;1=yes)  Differential on simple index 
∆Know  Notoriety of past POs  (1= at least one past PO, 0= none)  Differential on simple index 
∆StockEx 
Perception of stock market 
behavior 
(1=positive,0=neutral,-1=negative)  Differential on simple index 
∆Consider 
I’ve considered the idea to 
invest in stocks 
synthetic index with weight: 
I agree completely =2, I agree =1, I do not 
know=0, I do not agree =-1, I do not agree at 
all =-2 
Differential on weight index 
∆Volatil  Investing in stocks is a bet 
synthetic index with weight: 
total agreement=2, enough agreement=1,not 
agree, not disagree=0,little agree=-1, not at all 
agree=-2 
Differential on weight index 
∆Return 
Investing in stocks is more 
profitable than holding 
government securities 
synthetic index with weight: 
total agreement=2, enough agreement=1,not 
agree, not disagree=0,little agree=-1, not at all 
agree=-2 
Differential on weight index 
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Table 6 - Cross Section Analysis – Best Model 
Dependent Variable: ∆ PROP 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Number of cross-sections used: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 90 
One-step weighting matrix 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
∆Know  0.046922  0.018613 2.520880 0.0136 
∆StockEx  0.087631  0.033641 2.604840 0.0108 
∆Consider  0.154140  0.024963 6.174688 0.0000 
∆Volatil  0.004378  0.024831 0.176293 0.8605 
∆Return  -0.060243 0.028039  -2.148515  0.0345 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared  0.455842      Mean dependent var  0.010725 
Adjusted R-squared  0.430235      S.D. dependent var  0.137186 
S.E. of regression  0.103551      Sum squared resid  0.911447 
F-statistic  17.80118      Durbin-Watson stat  2.097566 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared  0.236501      Mean dependent var  -0.003911 
Adjusted R-squared  0.200572      S.D. dependent var  0.120450 
S.E. of regression  0.107695      Sum squared resid  0.985849 
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.804096     
   27
Table 7 – Panel Analysis – Variables Used 
Acronym Variable Construction  Scale  Note 
        
Prop  Propensity to buy POs’ 
shares    -1;1  -1=no;0=I don’t know;1=yes 
Know_cum  Notoriety of past POs 
Average on cohort and stage 
(number of POs known/number on 
the list) 
0;1  
StockEx  Stock market’s state 
perceived 
Weighted  Average on the stock 
market state opinion  -2;2 weight:-2,-1,0,1,2. 
Volatil  Investing 
in shares is a bet  Weighted  Average on the opinion  -2;2  weight:-2,-1,0,1,2. 
Info  I don’t know 
how to invest in stocks 
Weighted  Average on the opinion -2;2 weight:-2,-1,0,1,2. 
Return 
Investing in shares is 
more profitable than 
holding public securities 
Weighted  Average on the opinion
-2;2 weight:-2,-1,0,1,2. 
OnlyRich 
Investing in shares is 
profitable only for the 
rich 
Weighted  Average on the opinion
-2;2 weight:-2,-1,0,1,2. 
Shares  Shares possession  Average percent of  shares’ owners 0;1   
Area  Geographical area  Average  1;3  3=North ;2=Center, 1=South 
Town_size Town  size    1;5 
1=up to 10 thousand; 2=10-30 
thousand …5=mode than 25 
thousand 
Sex Sex    1;2  1=M;  2=F 
Household Head  Head of household    1;2  1=yes;2=no 
 
Acronym Variable  Construction Scale 
f1 
First principal component on the variable: 
imm_techno; imm_internat; imm_solid;     
imm_importance 
equation: .38 * imm_techno + .30 * imm_internat + .25 
* imm_solid + .35 * imm_importance 
imm_techno  Company precursor on technology  Average vote on cohort and 
stage  1;10 
imm_internat International  company  Average vote on cohort and 
stage  1;10 
imm_solid  Company solid and safe  Average vote on cohort and 
stage  1;10 
imm_importance  Company that works in main sectors of 
economy 
Average vote on cohort and 
stage  1;10 
   28




Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2.35047 1.41871 0.5876 0.5876
2 0.93177 0.50031 0.2329 0.8206
3 0.43146 0.14515 0.1079 0.9284
4 0.28631 . 0.0716 1.0000
Rotated Factor Loadings (varimax rotation)
Variable | 1 factor Uniqueness
--------------------+--------------------------------
imm_techno | 0.89076 0.20655
imm_internat | 0.70895 0.49739
imm_solid | 0.59909 0.64109
imm_importance | 0.83397 0.30450
Scoring Coefficients





imm_importance | 0.35481  29
Table 9 – Panel Tobit Estimation 
 
Random-effects tobit regression                        Number of obs      =       306 
Group variable (i) : cohort                                   Number of groups   =        18 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                         Obs per group: min =        17 
                                                                                                     
                                                                            Wald chi2(12)      =    117.73 
Log likelihood  =   108.8808                              Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
Prop  Coefficient  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
           
Know_cum  .948  .478 1.98  0.048 .0104 1.885 
f1                     .024  .010  2.34  0.019  .004  .044 
StockEx                .042  .043  0.98  0.326  -.042  .127 
Volatil -.045  .037  -1.22  0.223  -.117  .027 
Info                  -.056  .030  -1.90  0.058  -.115  .002 
Return             056  .036  1.53  0.126  -.016  .127 
OnlyRich     .045  .033  1.37  0.172  -.019  .109 
Shares    .577  0.17  3.53  0.000  .256  .897 
Area -.079  .048  -1.64  0.100  -.174  .015 
Size_town         -.011  .027  -0.41  0.683  -.063  .041 
sex    -.210  .056  -3.78  0.000  -.320  -.101 
HouseholdHead    .197  .049  4.00  0.000  .100  .293 
_cons                -.455  .152  -2.99  0.003  -.753  -.156 
            
Sigma_u 4.40e-19  .02535  0.00  1.000  -.0496852  .0496852 
Sigma_e .1609039  .0066536  24.18  0.000  .1478631  .1739446 
Rho 7.48e-36  8.62e-19         
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